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Letting the Legislature Decide: Why the Court’s Use 
of In Loco Parentis Ought to Be Praised, Not 
Condemned 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1991, school athletes in Oregon were required to submit to 
random, involuntary drug tests before they were allowed to 
participate in school-sponsored sporting events.1 In 2002, Joseph 
Frederick received a ten-day suspension for unfurling a 14-foot 
banner with the inscription “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-
sponsored event.2 And in 2003, April Redding (who was thirteen at 
the time) was ordered to strip down to her underwear because she 
was suspected of possessing prescription-strength ibuprofen pills.3 At 
first glance, these cases appear extreme, but their underlying 
concerns are not only simple, but commonplace: teachers and school 
administrators across the nation are asked to deal with drug use, 
potentially offensive speech, and drug possession on a daily basis, and 
surely they do not need to be told by the United States Supreme 
Court that they cannot, for instance, conduct strip searches. And yet, 
the Supreme Court was required to determine, in each of these cases, 
whether school administrators were acting within the scope of their 
authority, which should raise the following question: How has the 
concept of “authority” in public schools been obscured to the point 
where an administrator actually thought that he had the authority to 
order a strip search of a student? 
In a recent law review article, Professor Susan Stuart has argued 
that the Supreme Court’s continued reliance upon the common law 
doctrine of in loco parentis (meaning “in the place of a parent”) is to 
blame for the confusion surrounding our understanding of 
“authority” in public schools, and forcefully declared that “in loco 
parentis ‘would be enormously improved by death.’”4 Stuart’s article 
 
 1. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648–51 (1995). 
 2. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397–98 (2007). 
 3. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009). 
 4. Susan Stuart, In Loco Parentis in the Public Schools: Abused, Confused, and in Need 
of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 983 (2009) (quoting H.H. MUNRO (“Saki”), The Feast of 
Nemesis, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SAKI 319, 322 (1976)). 
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presents two main arguments in support of this claim. First, she 
argues that the doctrine of in loco parentis, as originally articulated 
by Blackstone, was incompletely (and therefore improperly) adopted 
by American courts.5 Second, she contends that, because the 
doctrine is “anachronistic” within the context of modern education, 
it should no longer be applied.6 In place of in loco parentis, Stuart 
suggests that courts follow the advice of educational experts and 
adopt “objective norms of educational professionalism” because such 
norms would govern the relationships between students and school 
administrators in a more “predictable and noncontroversial fashion” 
than in loco parentis.7  
This Comment attempts to defend the Court’s continued 
reliance on in loco parentis against Stuart’s assault by arguing that 
not only do Stuart’s criticisms fail to provide sufficient reason for the 
Court to reject the doctrine outright, but furthermore her proposed 
solution is one that should be implemented by the legislature rather 
than the judiciary.  
This Comment will proceed as follows. Part II will briefly set 
forth the historical development of in loco parentis and how it came 
to be adopted by the United States’ judiciary. It will then describe 
how, within the context of student speech and student search cases, 
the Supreme Court has relied upon the doctrine in its struggle to 
define the contours of administrative authority in public schools. 
Part III will give a detailed explanation of Professor Stuart’s 
criticisms of in loco parentis, its adoption by the Supreme Court, and 
its application within the context of public education. Finally, Part 
IV will argue that Stuart’s criticisms ultimately fail to provide 
sufficient grounds for an outright rejection of in loco parentis, and 
will contend that society, through its duly appointed representatives, 
is in a much better position to clarify the concept of “authority” 
within our educational system than the judiciary. Hence the 
judiciary’s refusal to rewrite the concept of in loco parentis sua 
sponte is an example of judicial restraint that ought to be praised 
rather than condemned. 
 
 5. Id. at 985–96. 
 6. Id. at 971. 
 7. Id. at 1000, 1004. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF IN LOCO 
PARENTIS 
This Part briefly outlines the common law origins of in loco 
parentis, how it was adopted by U.S. courts, and how the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly relied upon it in its attempts to define the limits 
of school administrators’ authority in public schools. 
A. The Historical Roots of In Loco Parentis 
Professor Stuart notes in her article that “[t]he origins of the in 
loco parentis doctrine are murky,”8 which may be one reason why the 
doctrine has received a fair amount of attention from legal scholars in 
recent years.9 But whatever its origins,10 William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries are usually cited as the common law source of the 
doctrine.11 Blackstone declares: 
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during 
his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco 
parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent 
committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as 
may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is 
employed.12 
Stuart, along with others, points out that Blackstone did not cite any 
authority for this position.13 However, John C. Hogan and 
Mortimer D. Schwartz have argued that “[t]heorists from Aristotle 
onward have talked about the power of the father to control his 
 
 8. Id. at 972. 
 9. See, e.g., John C. Hogan & Mortimer D. Schwartz, In Loco Parentis in the United 
States 1765-1985, 8 J. LEGAL HIST. 260 (1987); Perry A. Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In 
Loco Parentis Doctrine Dead?, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 271 (1986); Brian Jackson, Note, The 
Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. 
L. REV. 1135 (1991). 
 10. Stuart speculates that the doctrine may date back to the Code of Hammurabi or 
ancient Roman times. Stuart, supra note 4, at 972–73. 
 11. Id. at 974 & n.20 (citing other journal articles that attribute the doctrine’s origin to 
Blackstone); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 413 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2655 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 12. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *441 
(1765). 
 13. Stuart, supra note 4, at 974; Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 271 n.4 (“We 
have seen no British case law that applies the term in loco parentis to schooling before this 
time.”). 
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children” and that “[t]he English philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, 
Mill) and the jurists (Grotius, Pufendorf) [also] helped lay a 
foundation for this subject.”14 Thus, despite Blackstone’s failure to 
cite precedential authority for his position relative to in loco parentis, 
his formulation of the doctrine was nevertheless accepted in 
England, and the formulation quoted above “has been widely 
quoted and followed by the courts.”15 
However, in her article Stuart emphasizes that regardless of how 
or where Blackstone came up with the idea, the important thing to 
note is how in loco parentis was ultimately interpreted by scholars 
and, more importantly, how it was adopted by U.S. courts.16 Hogan 
and Schwartz argue that in English law, in loco parentis evolved into 
“a very narrowly defined concept that placed limitations on the 
rights which were voluntarily given by the parent to the school,” and 
that these “rights” included “only a ‘portion of the power of the 
parent,’ that of restraint and correction.”17 The doctrine was then 
“readily imported [to America] from England as protection for 
public school teachers who saw the need to corporally punish 
students in the[i]r charge.”18 But, in contrast to its development in 
England, in the United States in loco parentis “took the form of a 
broad, although not unlimited, defense in criminal and civil suits for 
assault and battery.”19 
As evidence of this fact, Stuart cites to State v. Pendergrass,20 
which is one of the earliest—if not the earliest21—case to use the 
concept of in loco parentis in the school setting. In Pendergrass, 
North Carolina had charged a teacher with assault and battery for 
whipping a student.22 At trial, the district court instructed the jury 
that “if the child was whipped by the defendant so as to occasion the 
marks described by the prosecutor, the defendant had exceeded her 
 
 14. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 260. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Stuart, supra note 4, at 974–77, 990–96. 
 17. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 260 (emphasis added). 
 18. Stuart, supra note 4, at 975 (quoting Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 9, at 273) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 262–63. 
 19. Stuart, supra note 4, at 975 (quoting Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 9, at 273) 
(emphasis added); see also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 262–63. 
 20. 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 365, 366–68 (1837). 
 21. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 262. 
 22. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) at 367. 
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authority, and was guilty as charged.”23 However, on appeal the 
North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned as follows: 
It is not easy to state with precision, the power which the law 
grants to schoolmasters and teachers, with respect to the correction 
of their pupils. It is analogous to that which belongs to parents, and 
the authority of the teacher is regarded as a delegation of parental 
authority. One of the most sacred duties of parents, is to train up 
and qualify their children, for becoming useful and virtuous 
members of society; this duty cannot be effectually performed 
without the ability to command obedience, to control 
stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad habits; and 
to enable him to exercise this salutary sway, he is armed with the 
power to administer moderate correction, when he shall believe it 
to be just and necessary. The teacher is the substitute of the parent; is 
charged in part with the performance of his duties, and in the 
exercise of these delegated duties, is invested with his power.24 
While not invoking the Latin term in loco parentis directly, the 
concept being described here by the Pendergrass court is identical.25 
Because the “teacher is the substitute of the parent,” the teacher 
therefore has the authority to discipline the children entrusted to his 
care “when he shall believe it to be just and necessary.”26 In other 
words, the teacher “stands in the place of the parent” while the child 
is in his care, and thus the Pendergrass court reasoned that so long as 
the punishment inflicted upon the child does not “seriously 
endanger life, limbs or health, or shall disfigure the child, or cause 
any other permanent injury,” it is not criminally actionable.27 Hence, 
since the marks observed by the trial court disappeared within a few 
days, “[n]o permanent injury was done to the child,” and thus the 
trial court’s verdict was reversed.28 
Beginning with Pendergrass and continuing throughout the next 
century, the doctrine of in loco parentis was confined exclusively to 
the context of corporal punishment in schools.29 However, as Perry 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 365–66 (emphasis added). 
 25. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 262 (making the same observation); Stuart, 
supra note 4, at 975 (same). 
 26. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) at 365–66.  
 27. Id. at 366. 
 28. Id. at 367. 
 29. Stuart, supra note 4, at 976. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1700 
A. Zirkel and Henry F. Reichner have noted, courts began applying 
it in two different ways.30 In the first, courts gave great deference to 
the teacher’s discretion, “finding all punishment reasonable where 
there was no permanent injury or malo animo.”31 In the second, 
“which purported to be the modern and enlightened view . . . the 
reasonableness of the punishment [was] a question of fact to be 
determined by the trier of fact, usually a jury.”32 As Zirkel and 
Reichner go on to note, by the middle of the twentieth century the 
second, narrower view of in loco parentis commanded a majority of 
the courts.33 This view, as Stuart points out,34 was endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in 1977: 
The prevalent rule in this country today privileges such force as a 
teacher or administrator “reasonably believes to be necessary for 
[the child’s] proper control, training, or education.” To the extent 
that the force is excessive or unreasonable, the educator in virtually 
all States is subject to possible civil and criminal liability.35 
However, twentieth century teachers and administrators not only 
witnessed the judiciary revoke its grant of broad discretion under in 
loco parentis, but they also saw the doctrine being applied in 
educational contexts other than those dealing with corporal 
punishment. In fact, the doctrine has been evoked continuously in 
two of the most controversial lines of Supreme Court cases, namely, 
those dealing with student speech and student searches; these cases 
are the subject of the next two sections. 
B. In Loco Parentis and Student Speech 
Justice Thomas has pointed out in two opinions that, prior to 
the mid-twentieth century, “[t]he doctrine of in loco parentis limited 
the ability of schools to set rules and control their classrooms in 
almost no way.”36 However, as previously demonstrated, American 
 
 30. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 9, at 274–75. This phenomenon was also noted by 
Justice Thomas. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 416 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 31. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 9, at 274 (citing nineteenth-century cases from 
Alabama, Indiana, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Maine). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 275. 
 34. Stuart, supra note 4, at 976. 
 35. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 147(2) (1965)). 
 36. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 416 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 
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courts typically utilized the doctrine in cases dealing with discipline,37 
although Justice Thomas notes that the doctrine was eventually 
extended to permit school administrators to regulate student 
speech.38 For instance, Justice Thomas points to an early case 
wherein “the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the corporal 
punishment of a student who called his teacher ‘Old Jack Seaver’ in 
front of other students.”39 However, this expansive view of school 
administrators’ authority to regulate student speech appeared to be 
the main target of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, wherein the Court 
departed dramatically from the permissiveness of the in loco parentis 
doctrine.40 
1. Tinker’s attempt to reject in loco parentis 
In Tinker, a group of five students (ranging in age from eight to 
fifteen),41 along with their parents, decided to show their support for 
a truce in Vietnam by wearing black armbands during the holiday 
season.42 School administrators became aware of this plan and, in 
order to avoid a disturbance, instituted a policy prohibiting any 
student from wearing an armband while on school property.43 
According to the policy, any students who came to school wearing 
an armband would be asked to remove it, and if they refused, they 
would be suspended until they returned without the armband.44 Two 
students wore the armbands to school on December 16, and another 
student wore an armband on December 17.45 All were suspended 
and did not return to school until after New Year’s Day.46 
 
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2655 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“So empowered [by in loco parentis], 
schoolteachers and administrators had almost complete discretion to establish and enforce the 
rules they believed were necessary to maintain control over their classrooms.”). 
 37. See supra Part II.A. 
 38. Morse, 551 U.S. at 414 (“A review of the case law shows that in loco parentis 
allowed schools to regulate student speech as well.”). 
 39. Id. at 414–15 (citing Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 114–15 (1859)). 
 40. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 41.  Id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).  
 42. Id. at 504 (majority opinion).  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1702 
The Court classified the students’ decision to wear the armbands 
as symbolic speech,47 and actually went so far as to say that “[i]t was 
closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, is 
entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”48 
The Court then signaled its departure from the in loco parentis 
standard articulated earlier by famously declaring that “[i]t can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”49 However, the Court refused to go so far as to 
declare that the constitutional rights of students were coequal with 
those of adults.50 Instead, it qualified this sweeping language by 
stating, “First Amendment rights [must be] applied in light of the 
special characteristics of the school environment,”51 and hence these 
rights survive and are enforceable only if the speech in question does 
not “materially disrupt[] classwork or involve[] substantial disorder 
or invasion of the rights of others.”52 Because the Court could 
neither find a “material” or “substantial” disruption resulting from 
the students’ armbands, nor a violation of the rights of other 
students,53 it held that the First Amendment would not tolerate the 
suppression of such symbolic/political speech, and, therefore, that 
the students should have been allowed to wear their armbands in 
school.54 Additionally, the Court declared emphatically that “state-
operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism” and that 
“[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their 
students.”55 
Interestingly enough, neither the majority nor the dissent 
mentions the doctrine of in loco parentis explicitly, but the 
majority’s heated denunciation of the idea that “school officials 
possess absolute authority over their students” stands as the polar 
opposite to Justice Thomas’s portrayal of in loco parentis seen 
earlier.56 Hence, while it did not attack the doctrine by name, it is 
 
 47. Id. at 505. 
 48. Id. at 505–06. 
 49. Id. at 506. 
 50. Id. at 514–15 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. at 506 (majority opinion). 
 52. Id. at 513. 
 53. Id. at 509. 
 54. Id. at 514. 
 55. Id. at 511. 
 56. “The doctrine of in loco parentis limited the ability of schools to set rules and 
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probably safe to say that one of the majority’s objectives in Tinker 
was to strike at the heart of the in loco parentis doctrine by 
recognizing that students have constitutional rights while they are at 
school, which was not true under the prior conceptualization of in 
loco parentis.57 As further proof of this fact, it is interesting to note 
how the dissent strikes back at the majority’s new rule by pointing 
out how “[s]chool discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral 
and important part of training our children to be good citizens—to 
be better citizens.”58 Here, Justice Black’s subtle comparison of 
parental and educational authority and their proper roles in the 
formation of “good citizens” sounds eerily similar to the arguments 
given in support of the doctrine of in loco parentis mentioned 
earlier.59 But whatever its motivations, the Tinker Court did not 
succeed in banishing the doctrine of in loco parentis from the field of 
student speech, for in subsequent student speech cases, the Court 
called upon the doctrine repeatedly in order to limit the application 
of Tinker’s holding.60 
2. The Court’s return to in loco parentis in Bethel School District No. 
403 v. Fraser 
The next student speech case to reach the Supreme Court was 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.61 In this case, Fraser, a high 
school senior, had delivered a nomination speech for a fellow student 
who was running for student office at a school-sponsored assembly 
that was attended by over 600 students, “many of whom were 14-
year-olds.”62 The speech itself was described by the majority as “an 
 
control their classrooms in almost no way.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 416 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 57. See generally Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? 
Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49 (1996). 
 58. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 59. See supra Part II.A. 
 60. Justice Thomas has criticized the Tinker decision openly on the grounds that the 
Court has never applied the Tinker test in any subsequent student speech case. In fact, he 
attributes this reluctance to affirm (and use) Tinker because it conflicts with the doctrine of in 
loco parentis, the very doctrine that Tinker seems to repudiate: “Tinker’s reasoning conflicted 
with the traditional understanding of the judiciary’s role in relation to public schooling, a role 
limited by in loco parentis. Perhaps for that reason, the Court has since scaled back Tinker’s 
standard, or rather set the standard aside on an ad hoc basis.” Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 417 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 61. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 62. Id. at 677. 
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elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor,”63 and the Court 
noted that, in response to the speech, “[s]ome students hooted and 
yelled” while others “by gestures graphically simulated the sexual 
activities pointedly alluded to in [Fraser’s] speech.”64 However, 
besides the initial reaction to the speech at the assembly itself, the 
“disturbance” caused by the speech (if any) appeared rather limited, 
as the Court noted that only “[o]ne teacher reported that on the day 
following the speech, she found it necessary to forgo a portion of the 
scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the class.”65 
However, despite the apparent lack of a “material disruption to 
classwork” or a “substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
others,” which was the standard set forth by Tinker,66 the Court 
found that the school’s decision to suspend Fraser for delivering his 
speech did not violate Fraser’s First Amendment rights because “the 
essence . . . of the objectives of public education [is] the 
‘inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of 
a democratic political system.’”67 Because these “‘fundamental 
values’ . . . disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or 
highly threatening to others,”68 the power to determine “what 
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is 
inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”69 Therefore, the 
Court held that the school board’s decision to punish Fraser was 
entirely proper.70 
 
 63. Id. at 678. The majority does not quote from the speech directly, but Justice 
Brennan gives the full text of Fraser’s speech in his concurrence: 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character 
is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff 
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts—he drives hard, 
pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very 
end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. 
vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high school can be. 
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 678 (majority opinion). 
 65. Id. 
 66. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1968). 
 67. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (alteration in original) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 
U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979)). 
 68. Id. at 683. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 686. 
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Interestingly enough, one of the concepts that the Court used to 
justify the foregoing syllogism was none other than the doctrine of in 
loco parentis. First, the Court equated the teacher’s duty to model 
appropriate behavior with a parent’s duty to do likewise.71 The Court 
stated, “[c]onsciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older 
students—demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and 
political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of 
class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.”72 This is indeed 
quite a shift from the Tinker Court’s characterization of public 
schools as potential “enclaves of totalitarianism.”73 But the Fraser 
Court continued by citing a number of cases and then concluding 
that “[t]hese cases recognize the obvious concern on the part of 
parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect 
children—especially in a captive audience—from exposure to sexually 
explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.”74 
Hence, whatever effect Tinker may have had on the in loco 
parentis doctrine, Fraser proved that the doctrine was alive and well. 
In fact, when compared with Tinker, Fraser appears to be an almost 
complete reversal of direction. Whereas school administrators and 
teachers in Tinker were characterized as despots intent on running 
totalitarian regimes,75 Fraser returns to the in loco parentis model 
where teachers and administrators stand in the place of parents as 
“role models” with an identical duty to inculcate in the children 
under their care the “fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system.”76 Aided by this view, 
the Court had no trouble deferring to the school board’s decision to 
punish Fraser’s speech, despite the fact that neither of Tinker’s 
criteria were met. 
3. Expanding Fraser in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
The Court revisited the subject of student speech just two years 
after Fraser in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,77 wherein a 
group of high school students sued their principal and the school 
 
 71. Id. at 683. 
 72. Id. (emphasis added). 
 73. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968). 
 74. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684. 
 75. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
 76. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. 
 77. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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district for infringing their First Amendment rights by suppressing 
the publication of two articles in a student-run newspaper.78 The 
newspaper was run in conjunction with the school’s “Journalism II” 
course, was funded by the school, and was supervised by both an 
adviser and the principal.79 Pursuant to the school’s policy, on May 
10, 1983 the adviser for the course submitted the page proofs for 
the May 13th edition of the paper (which happened to be the final 
edition of the school year) to the principal for his approval.80 The 
principal noted that two of the articles—one dealing with teen 
pregnancy at the school and the other with the impact of divorce—
did not properly maintain the confidentiality of the students who 
were interviewed for the pieces. The principal also feared that the 
subjects might be inappropriate for the younger students at the high 
school.81 Because there was not enough time before the end of the 
school year for the pieces to be rewritten, the principal decided to go 
ahead and publish the May 13th edition without the two articles, 
and his superiors affirmed that decision.82 
The Court, as in Fraser, acknowledged Tinker’s attribution of 
constitutional rights to students by quoting Tinker’s “schoolhouse 
gate” language,83 but, like Fraser, the Court refused to apply the 
Tinker test to these facts.84 Instead, the Court saw fit to distinguish 
Tinker by arguing that it addressed a different question than the one 
raised by Kuhlmeier,85 and it then expanded the categories of speech 
that school administrators can permissibly regulate to include 
“expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.”86 Hence, while Fraser recognized the schoolteacher’s duty 
 
 78. Id. at 263–64. 
 79. Id. at 262–63. 
 80. Id. at 263–64. 
 81. Id. at 263. 
 82. Id. at 264. 
 83. Id. at 266. 
 84. Interestingly, the Court may have been able to come to the same conclusion via the 
Tinker test, since while it is doubtful that the publication of the articles would have led to a 
“material disruption,” the privacy rights of the students interviewed for the articles were in 
danger of being infringed, and hence, under Tinker, the principal may have been permitted to 
suppress the speech. 
 85. According to the Court, Tinker dealt with the types of speech that must be tolerated 
by schools, while Kuhlmeier raised the question of what sorts of speech the First Amendment 
requires the school “affirmatively to promote.” Id. at 270. 
 86. Id. at 271. 
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to protect younger students from lewd, obscene, or indecent speech 
and gave the teacher power to suppress or punish such speech, 
Kuhlmeier expanded this power to include the suppression of speech 
that third persons might reasonably attribute to the school itself. 
Hence, if the speech in question is “school sponsored,” as it was here 
(i.e., the paper was paid for by the school, run by school teachers and 
administrators, and its purpose was primarily pedagogical in nature), 
then “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech . . . so 
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”87 The Court then concluded that because the principal’s 
actions were reasonably related to the pedagogical concerns of the 
Journalism II course, no First Amendment violation had occurred.88  
Although the Kuhlmeier Court did not mention in loco parentis, 
the tenor of the opinion is quite similar to that of Fraser’s: students’ 
First Amendment rights are recognized, but overruled by the 
Court’s insistence that schools are responsible not just for educating 
the children in their care, but also for overseeing their development 
into citizens of a democratic society. In fact, the Court in Kuhlmeier 
cites, in addition to Fraser, Brown v. Board of Education in support 
of this idea.89 Thus, the Kuhlmeier Court, rather than limiting school 
authority, continued to expand the power that school administrators 
can exercise over student speech, and it did so by relying on concepts 
that are closely related to in loco parentis. 
4. Limiting Tinker again in Morse v. Frederick 
The most recent student speech case to reach the Supreme Court 
was Morse v. Frederick.90 In this case, Joseph Frederick, a high school 
senior, arrived at school to attend an outdoor assembly where the 
student body would witness the passing of the Olympic torch.91 As 
the torch passed the students (and the television cameras), Frederick 
and a few friends unfurled a fourteen-foot banner that read “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS.”92 Morse, Frederick’s principal, saw the banner and 
 
 87. Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. at 276. 
 89. Id. at 272. 
 90. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 91. Id. at 397. 
 92. Id. 
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immediately crossed the street and ordered Frederick to take it 
down.93 Frederick’s friends immediately complied, but Frederick 
refused.94 Morse ended up confiscating the banner and suspending 
Frederick for ten days for violating school policies, a decision which 
was upheld by the school board.95 Frederick subsequently sued, 
alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights.96  
Once again, the Court was presented with an opportunity to 
apply the Tinker standard, and once again, it refused to do so. 
Instead, the Court noted that the Tinker standard, when viewed in 
light of subsequent student speech cases (most notably Fraser), “is 
not absolute” and “is not the only basis for restricting student 
speech.”97 Once free from Tinker, the Court relied on many of the 
same concerns that were articulated in Fraser and Kuhlmeier, most 
notably the school’s “custodial and tutelary responsibility for 
children,”98 and its duty to protect them from harmful speech which, 
in this case, arguably advocated the use of illegal drugs.99 Hence, 
because of the school’s “‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’ 
interest”100 in deterring drug use; because Frederick’s sign, while 
“cryptic,” could reasonably be construed as advocating drug use;101 
because it was unfurled at a school-sponsored event and could 
therefore be viewed as “bearing the imprimatur of the school”; and 
because it was unfurled in the presence of other students, the Court 
found that the principal’s decision to suppress the speech did not 
amount to a violation of Frederick’s First Amendment rights.102 
The most interesting pieces of the Morse decision, however, are 
found in the concurring opinions of Justices Thomas and Alito, 
wherein they debate the future of the doctrine of in loco parentis as 
applied within the context of student speech. In his opinion, Justice 
Thomas notes how Tinker has been virtually nonexistent in the 
Court’s student speech jurisprudence and actually attributes this fact 
 
 93. Id. at 398. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 398–99. 
 96. Id. at 399. 
 97. Id. at 405–06. 
 98. Id. at 406 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829–30 (2002)). 
 99. Id. at 407–09. 
 100. Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)). 
 101. Id. at 401–02. 
 102. Id. at 410. 
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to in loco parentis itself: “Tinker’s reasoning conflicted with the 
traditional understanding of the judiciary’s role in relation to public 
schooling, a role limited by in loco parentis. Perhaps for that reason, 
the Court has since scaled back Tinker’s standard, or rather set the 
standard aside on an ad hoc basis.”103 Instead of pursuing this “ad 
hoc” rejection of Tinker, Justice Thomas argues for a full-fledged 
return to in loco parentis under which students simply would not 
have a right to free speech.104 
Justice Alito counters this view by arguing the following: 
When public school authorities regulate student speech, they act as 
agents of the State; they do not stand in the shoes of the students’ 
parents. It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply 
delegate their authority—including their authority to determine 
what their children may say and hear—to public school 
authorities.105 
Justice Alito then concurs with the majority’s result not based on a 
theory of delegation of parental authority to the school 
administrators, but based on the special characteristics of the school 
setting.106  
The differences between Justice Thomas’s and Justice Alito’s 
approaches highlight the difficulties confronting the Court in the 
arena of student speech. Originally, as Justice Thomas points out, 
the contours of the concept of “authority” within a public school 
were determined by in loco parentis, which gave almost unlimited 
authority to the teacher.107 Once Tinker recognized the existence of 
students’ constitutional rights, however, teachers became more like 
“agents of the State” than agents of the students’ parents, and 
consequently the extent of their authority was limited severely. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen in the cases that followed Tinker, the 
Court has proven that it is unwilling to forsake the in loco parentis 
model entirely. Instead, rather than stick to Tinker’s “material 
disruption” and “third-party rights” standards (and the “agents-of-
the-State” model that both imply), the Court has, in three 
consecutive cases, found ways to avoid applying Tinker. The Court 
 
 103. Id. at 417 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. at 418–19. 
 105. Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 419 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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has done this usually by either relying explicitly on in loco parentis 
(as it did in Fraser) or by relying on concepts related thereto (as it 
did in Kuhlmeier and Morse).108 Hence, the Court seems to be at a 
jurisprudential crossroads of sorts: on the one hand is the common 
law doctrine of in loco parentis, while on the other is Tinker’s 
implied agents-of-the-state model. As of the date of this Comment, 
the Court has yet to affirmatively decide between the two. 
C. There and Back Again: In Loco Parentis in School Search Cases 
Unfortunately, the role in loco parentis plays in the Supreme 
Court’s student search jurisprudence is not any clearer than its role 
in the student speech cases. Nevertheless, as illustrated in the student 
speech cases,109 the Court has been reluctant to abandon the concept 
entirely, which reluctance can also be seen in the Court’s student 
search cases. Furthermore, as in the student speech cases, the same 
tension between the in loco parentis model of authority and that of 
the agent-of-the-state model emerges from the student search cases. 
1. New Jersey v. T.L.O and the “death” of in loco parentis 
For example, the controversy in New Jersey v. T.L.O. centered 
around “what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on the 
activities of school authorities.”110 T.L.O., a high school freshman, 
was caught smoking in the lavatory and was sent to the principal’s 
office, where she denied smoking at all.111 Upon hearing this denial, 
the principal demanded to see T.L.O.’s purse, wherein he found 
cigarettes and rolling papers that, in his experience, were associated 
with marijuana use.112 Given the results of his initial search, the 
principal believed that a closer search might yield more evidence of 
drug use, and so he conducted a thorough search of T.L.O’s purse, 
wherein he found marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a large 
amount of cash (all one-dollar bills), a list of students who owed 
T.L.O. money, and two letters that implicated her in drug dealing.113 
 
 108.  See infra Part II.B. 
 109. See infra Part II.B. 
 110. 469 U.S. 325, 332 (1985). 
 111. Id. at 328. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
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The principal then notified the police, and T.L.O. subsequently 
confessed to selling marijuana at the school.114  
During T.L.O.’s delinquency proceedings, T.L.O. moved to 
suppress the evidence procured by the principal because she argued 
that the search violated her Fourth Amendment rights.115 The trial 
court ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied in the school setting 
but also provides protection to teachers and school administrators if 
there is “reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to 
maintain school discipline or enforce school policies.”116 The trial 
court concluded that because the search was reasonable, no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred, and the appellate court affirmed.117 
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
search was not reasonable, and the Supreme Court granted New 
Jersey’s petition for certiorari.118 
The majority begins its opinion by noting the tension between 
the in loco parentis model of school authority and the agents-of-the-
state model:  
Some courts have resolved [this] tension . . . by giving full force to 
one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of cases 
courts have held that school officials conducting in-school searches 
of students are private parties acting in loco parentis and are 
therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment.119 
The Court goes on to completely reject the in loco parentis approach 
as being “in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of 
this court.”120 Because state boards of education are creatures of the 
state,121 and because the Court has already recognized the First 
Amendment rights of students,122 the Court concluded that “school 
officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for 
 
 114. Id. at 328–29. 
 115. Id. at 329. 
 116. Id. (quoting State ex rel. T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1333 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 
1980, )). 
 117. Id. at 330. 
 118. Id. at 330–31. 
 119. Id. at 332 n.2 (citations omitted). 
 120. Id. at 336. 
 121. Id. at 334. 
 122. Id.at 336 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969)). 
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the parents, and they cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the 
strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”123 However, the Court then 
declared that the procedures for complying with the Fourth 
Amendment in a school setting should be less strict than those 
imposed upon law enforcement, and eventually imposed a two-part 
“reasonableness” test on school searches.124 Because the principal did 
not violate either part of the reasonableness inquiry, the Court 
ultimately concluded that the search was reasonable and therefore no 
Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.125 
Like Tinker, on its face T.L.O. appears to be an express rejection 
of the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis, and its language 
seems to strongly suggest that the Supreme Court wanted to prevent 
lower courts from using in loco parentis to shield school teachers and 
administrators from liability for constitutional violations. Under 
T.L.O., teachers and administrators are clearly treated as agents of 
the state instead of the students’ parents, and hence the scope of 
their authority is much more limited than it is under in loco parentis. 
In fact, in her article Professor Stuart notes that after T.L.O. (which 
came on the heels of Tinker and before either Fraser or Kuhlmeier) 
“scholars were tolling the death knell of in loco parentis in public 
education.”126 However, as we saw in the student speech cases that 
followed Tinker, in loco parentis was not so easily banished, and the 
same is true of the Court’s student search jurisprudence. 
2. Back to in loco parentis in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 
The Court waited ten years before it accepted another student 
search case, and when it did, it performed an about-face away from 
T.L.O.’s limited view of administrative authority and back towards a 
more permissive view inspired by in loco parentis. In Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton, the Court was confronted with the question of 
whether a school district can impose mandatory drug tests on 
student-athletes before allowing them to participate in school-
 
 123. Id. 336–37 (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. at 341–42 (holding that a constitutional search must be (1) “‘justified at its 
inception’” and (2) “‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.’” The search also must not be “excessively intrusive.” (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
 125. Id. at 346–48. 
 126. Stuart, supra note 4, at 977. 
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sponsored sporting events.127 In an opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia relying heavily on in loco parentis, the Court held that such a 
program could withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge.128  
Justice Scalia begins his argument by making the following 
observation: “When parents place minor children in private schools 
for their education, the teachers and administrators of those schools 
stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to them. In fact, 
the tutor or schoolmaster is the very prototype of that status.”129 Of 
course, the Vernonia School District consisted of public, not private 
schools, and thus Justice Scalia had to acknowledge that “[i]n T.L.O. 
we rejected the notion that public schools, like private schools, 
exercise only parental power over their students, which of course is 
not subject to constitutional constraints.”130 Nevertheless, having 
acknowledged T.L.O.’s apparent rejection of in loco parentis within 
the context of public education, Justice Scalia proceeds to resurrect it 
by using Fraser as a conceptual bridge. Scalia does this by first 
arguing that T.L.O. “did not deny, but indeed emphasized, that the 
nature of [education authority] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a 
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over 
free adults.”131 This recognition of “custodial and tutelary” 
authority, of course, was the same line of logic that led the Court 
back to in loco parentis in Fraser after it had been rejected in Tinker, 
and Scalia did not hesitate to use the same reasoning to accomplish 
the same thing:  
While we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general 
matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to 
a constitutional “duty to protect,” we have acknowledged that for 
many purposes “school authorities ac[t] in loco parentis,” with the 
power and indeed the duty to “inculcate the habits and manners of 
civility.”132 
In this passage, Scalia cleverly uses the concept of “custodial and 
tutelary authority,” which was recognized in both T.L.O. and Fraser, 
 
 127. 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995). 
 128. Id. at 648, 664–65.  
 129. Id. at 654–55. 
 130. Id. at 655 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985)). 
 131. Id. (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. at 655–56 (alteration in original) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 684 (1986)). 
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as the key premise in an argument that allows him to circumvent 
T.L.O.’s apparent rejection of the doctrine of in loco parentis. In 
essence, the argument looks like this: 
1. Public school teachers and administrators have “custodial and 
tutelary authority” over their students (T.L.O.133 and Fraser134). 
2. This “custodial and tutelary authority” includes the “power and 
indeed the duty to ‘inculcate the habits and manners of civility’” in 
students.135 
3. When public school teachers and administrators exercise their 
power to “inculcate the habits and manners of civility” in their 
students, they are acting in loco parentis (Fraser).136 
4. Therefore, public school teachers and administrators, by 
standing in loco parentis, have the power to limit the constitutional 
rights of the students entrusted to their care.137 
And thus the circle is complete: by relying on Fraser (which, of 
course, was not a student search case and therefore did not implicate 
the Fourth Amendment) Scalia was able to circumvent the Court’s 
holding in T.L.O. and restore the concept of in loco parentis in 
search cases occurring within the public school context. In other 
words, under Vernonia, a teacher’s authority is “custodial and 
tutelary,” and teachers stand in loco parentis to the extent necessary 
to fulfill their duty to “inculcate the habits and manners of civility” 
in the children entrusted to their care.138 Thus, whatever rights 
 
 133. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (“[A] proper educational environment requires close 
supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would 
be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.”). 
 134. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683–84 (explaining that teachers are role models, who, like 
parents, have a duty “to protect children—especially in a captive audience—from exposure to 
sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech”). 
 135. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681). 
 136. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683–84 (stating explicitly that teachers have a duty to 
inculcate the “fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political 
system,” that teachers are to be role models, and that teachers, especially when acting to 
protect students, act in loco parentis). 
 137. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655–56 (“Thus, while children assuredly do not ‘shed their 
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,’ the nature of those rights is what is 
appropriate for children in school.” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))). 
 138. See id. at 665 (“The most significant element in this case is the first we discussed: 
that the [drug testing] [p]olicy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s 
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to 
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students have, they are necessarily limited by the administration’s 
ability to stand in loco parentis and to determine the best way to 
fulfill their custodial and tutelary responsibilities. Because the 
Vernonia School District attempted to fulfill these responsibilities by 
instituting the drug testing program (thereby discouraging drug 
use), the “relevant question” in the case was whether the policy was 
“one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake” 
pursuant to the authority that accompanies a tutor or guardian.139 
Because the Court found that the search was reasonable, it held that 
the policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment.140 
This conclusion, however, highlights the same tension seen 
earlier in the student speech cases, namely the tension between the in 
loco parentis and agents-of-the-state models of administrative 
authority in public schools. Under in loco parentis, teachers had 
almost unlimited authority since their authority derived from a 
delegation of parental authority. Therefore, a teacher’s decision to 
conduct a search would not be “subject to constitutional 
constraints” because a parent’s authority to conduct such a search 
would not be.141 However, T.L.O. rejected this model as 
“anachronistic,” favoring instead a model that viewed school 
administrators as agents of the state who had responsibilities and 
constraints similar to other government officials.142 Nevertheless, in 
Vernonia the Court balked at affirming this model, and instead 
returned to the more permissive view of administrative authority 
afforded by in loco parentis.143 However, the Court left 
administrators in a bit of a bind since it neither restored in loco 
parentis completely nor disavowed the agents-of-the-state model 
entirely. Hence, administrators had a right to wonder whether they 
really stood in loco parentis, with all the powers that doctrine 
implies, whether they were agents of the state, or whether their 
authority fell somewhere in between. Unfortunately, in its next two 
student search cases, the Court failed to answer this question 
definitively. 
 
its care.” (emphasis added)). 
 139. Id.  
 140.  Id. at 664–65.  
 141. Id. at 655 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985)). 
 142.  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338–39.  
 143.  See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654–56. 
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3. Affirming Vernonia in Board of Education v. Earls 
Almost ten years after Vernonia in Board of Education v. Earls, 
the Supreme Court was again asked to determine whether a school 
district’s mandatory drug testing policy was constitutional.144 
However, unlike Vernonia, the school district in this case applied the 
policy not just to student athletes, but to any student who wished to 
participate in any extracurricular activity.145 Earls challenged the 
policy as a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights,146 but the 
Court, relying on Vernonia, upheld the policy as constitutional.147 
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, citing Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Vernonia, again strongly emphasized the “custodial responsibility 
and authority” given to school administrators,148 and Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion actually equated these “custodial responsibilities” 
with the doctrine of in loco parentis itself: 
The law itself recognizes these responsibilities with the phrase in 
loco parentis—a phrase that draws its legal force primarily from the 
needs of younger students (who here are necessarily grouped 
together with older high school students) and which reflects, not 
that a child or adolescent lacks an interest in privacy, but that a 
child’s or adolescent’s school-related privacy interest, when 
compared to the privacy interest of an adult, has different 
dimensions.149 
Thus in Earls, the Court again showed its reluctance to affirm 
T.L.O.’s dismissal of in loco parentis. Instead, like Scalia’s opinion in 
Vernonia, Earls’s majority and concurring opinions, when taken 
together, draw an explicit link between T.L.O.’s language regarding 
teachers’ and administrators’ custodial and tutelary responsibilities 
and the doctrine of in loco parentis itself. However, as in Vernonia, 
the Court in Earls did not restore in loco parentis completely, nor 
did it reject T.L.O.’s agents-of-the-state model. This again raised the 
question of whether a teacher or administrator’s authority was more 
 
 144. 536 U.S. 822, 826–27 (2002). 
 145. Id. at 826. 
 146. Id. at 826–27. 
 147. Id. at 825, 838. 
 148. Id. at 831 (indicating that Vernonia did not turn on relative expectations for privacy 
in different extracurricular activities, but rather “upon the school’s custodial responsibility and 
authority”). 
 149. Id. at 840 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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akin to that of a parent or that of an agent of the state, a failure that 
would be highlighted by Justice Thomas in his opinion in Safford 
Unified School District v. Redding.150 
4. Limiting in loco parentis in Safford Unified School District v. 
Redding 
In a sense, Safford Unified School District v. Redding is the 
perfect illustration of the difficulties facing both school 
administrators and the Court when it comes to determining the 
extent of an educator’s authority within a public school. In this case 
Kerry Wilson, an assistant principal, received a tip from another 
student that Savana Redding was distributing prescription-strength 
ibuprofen pills to other students.151 He escorted Redding to his 
office and after a search of her backpack revealed nothing, Wilson 
ordered an administrative assistant to escort Redding to the school 
nurse’s office so that they could search her clothes for pills.152 Once 
there, the administrative assistant and the nurse 
asked [Redding] to remove her jacket, socks, and shoes, leaving her 
in stretch pants and a T-shirt (both without pockets), which she 
was then asked to remove. Finally, Savana was told to pull her bra 
out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her 
underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some 
degree.153 
No pills were found, but Redding filed suit against the school district 
and everyone involved with the search, alleging that the strip search 
violated her Fourth Amendment rights.154 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Souter agreed, holding that it was not constitutional for a 
school administrator to order a strip search of a student.155 The 
Court also held that because the state of the law was unclear at the 
time Wilson ordered the search, the school administrators were 
entitled to qualified immunity.156 
 
 150.  129 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 151. Id. at 2640 (majority opinion). 
 152. Id. at 2638.  
 153. Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155. Id. at 2644. 
 156. Id. 
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In his opinion, Justice Souter tacitly acknowledged the role that 
in loco parentis might have played in Wilson’s decision to order the 
strip search when he stated that “[p]arents are known to overreact to 
protect their children from danger, and a school official with 
responsibility for safety may tend to do the same.”157 Justice Souter 
acknowledged that there is a similarity between the concern a parent 
has for children under his care, and that of a school administrator.158 
This idea, of course, is precisely the link that allowed the Court to 
return to in loco parentis after T.L.O. because both parents and 
school administrators are charged with “custodial and tutelary” 
responsibilities; in this sense the administrators stand in loco parentis 
over the children in their charge. However, in Redding the Court 
limited the in loco parentis model further than it had in its prior 
decisions, arguing that, in addition to it being clear that the 
administrator was acting in accordance with his “custodial and 
tutelary” responsibilities, it must also be clear that his actions were 
“reasonable.”159 Because the Court felt that there was no indication 
that Redding posed any danger to her fellow students, and because 
there was no indication that she had concealed pills in her 
underwear, the Court concluded that “the combination of these 
deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable.”160 
In his opinion, Justice Thomas lambasted the majority for failing 
to adhere to the “reasonableness” rule set forth in T.L.O., which 
stated that “the Court was ‘unwilling to adopt a standard under 
which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge’s evaluation 
of the relative importance of school rules.’”161 Furthermore, Justice 
Thomas argued that “[j]udges are not qualified to second-guess the 
best manner for maintaining quiet and order in the school 
environment,”162 and even if they were, they should not be allowed 
 
 157. Id. at 2643. 
 158. Whether or not Wilson viewed himself as standing in loco parentis is, of course, 
unclear. However, given the more permissive view of administrative authority provided by the 
doctrine, and the Court’s affirmation of it in both Vernonia and Earls, it is likely that Wilson 
honestly believed he had the authority to order the search, especially since he did, in fact, order 
the search. 
 159. Id. at 2642–43, 2646 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995)). 
 160. Id. at 2643 (majority opinion). 
 161. Id. at 2651 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985)). 
 162. Id. at 2652. 
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to do so. Justice Thomas’s reason for this conclusion is that such a 
rule would become unworkable: “School officials cannot be expected 
to halt searches based on the possibility that a court might later find 
that the particular infraction at issue is not severe enough to warrant 
an intrusive investigation.”163 But, Justice Thomas argued, that is 
precisely what the majority did in Redding.164 By determining that 
Wilson’s search was unreasonable because Redding (in the Court’s 
view) did not pose a threat to her fellow students, and because there 
was no evidence pointing towards the necessity of a strip search, the 
Court was effectively “second-guessing” Wilson’s judgment.165 Such 
second-guessing, Justice Thomas asserted, runs contrary to both the 
Court’s student search precedent specifically and its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence generally.166 
Additionally, and perhaps out of frustration at the confusing 
picture Redding paints for school administrators going forward, 
Justice Thomas concluded his opinion by calling for a “complete 
restoration of the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis,” under 
which the strip-search of Redding would be constitutional, since 
“[t]here can be no doubt that a parent would have had the authority 
to conduct the search at issue in this case.”167 Justice Thomas’s 
motivations for making this suggestion seem clear: in addition to the 
fact that such a restoration would make clear the extent of 
administrative authority within public schools (i.e., it would be 
virtually limitless), Justice Thomas also believes that it would grant 
the power of determining how and to what extent this authority 
should be limited to parents and legislators rather than judges.168 For 
instance, if parents disagreed with an administrator’s decision or with 
a school district’s adoption of a particular rule, they would have 
“redress in school boards or legislatures; they can send their children 
to private schools or home school them; or they can simply 
move.”169 In fact, Justice Thomas argued that completely restoring 
in loco parentis would go a long way towards resolving the 
 
 163. Id. at 2651–52. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 2648–49, 2651–53. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 2655–56. 
 168. Id. at 2656–58. 
 169. Id. at 2656 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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ambiguities swirling around the concept of administrative authority 
because it would relieve the judiciary of the burden of resolving 
those ambiguities, a task that Justice Thomas argues 
is beyond this Court’s function. Parents, teachers, school 
administrators, local politicians, and state officials are all better 
suited than judges to determine the appropriate limits on searches 
conducted by school officials. Preservation of order, discipline, and 
safety in public schools is simply not the domain of the 
Constitution. And, common sense is not a judicial monopoly or a 
Constitutional imperative.170 
5. Some final, historical observations 
This Part has attempted to show how in loco parentis has 
influenced the Court in its repeated attempts to determine the extent 
of administrative authority within public schools. Unfortunately, 
Justice Thomas’s snide characterization of the Court’s student 
speech jurisprudence in Morse is probably correct: “students have a 
right to speak in schools except when they don’t—a standard 
continuously developed through litigation against local schools and 
their administrators.”171 Furthermore, in light of Redding, this 
characterization is probably true of the Court’s student search 
jurisprudence as well: generally, administrators have the authority to 
order student searches except when they don’t—a standard that has 
continuously developed through litigation.  
Of course, this is just another way of saying that the Court has 
failed to accurately determine the extent of administrative authority 
in public schools, at least when it comes to questions regarding 
student speech and student searches. Instead, uncertainty and 
confusion abound in both of these areas, due mainly to the fact that 
the Court has vacillated between two conceptions of administrative 
authority: that of in loco parentis, where administrative authority is 
practically unlimited and is derived directly from parental authority, 
and that of the agents-of-the-state model, where administrative 
authority is severely limited and derived from the authority of the 
state. Because the Court has yet to affirmatively choose one over the 
other, school administrators, teachers, parents, students, and their 
lawyers have a right to be confused about which model ought to be 
 
 170. Id. at 2657. 
 171. Morse, 551 U.S. at 418. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:30 PM 
1695 Letting the Legislature Decide 
 1721 
used to evaluate an administrative decision. But is the doctrine of in 
loco parentis to blame for this confusion? Although Justice Thomas’s 
suggestion that the Court completely restore the doctrine strongly 
indicates that it is not,172 Professor Stuart, for one, has argued that it 
is the primary culprit.173 
III. SHOULD IN LOCO PARENTIS BE “PUT OUT OF ITS MISERY”? 
The title of Professor Susan Stuart’s article, “In Loco Parentis in 
the Public Schools: Abused, Confused, and in Need of Change,” is a bit 
misleading, since what Professor Stuart is really arguing for is not a 
modification of in loco parentis, but its eradication.174 Professor 
Stuart argues, “Ultimately, this Article expostulates that the in loco 
parentis doctrine should be put out of its misery: if courts will not 
allow it to go the way of the dodo, then it will have to be eradicated 
like the ubiquitous kudzu.”175 In support of this conclusion, 
Professor Stuart offers two arguments. First, she argues that in loco 
parentis ought to be abandoned by the courts because “it was never 
properly implemented by the courts in the United States,” and 
second, she argues that in loco parentis “is no longer appropriate to 
the modern needs of public education.”176 Each of these arguments 
will now be explained in detail. 
A. The Improper Implementation of In Loco Parentis in the United 
States 
Professor Stuart’s first argument for abandoning in loco parentis 
stems from her view that the doctrine was misinterpreted by 
American courts.177 According to Stuart, Blackstone’s original 
articulation of in loco parentis was not limited to just the parents’ 
disciplinary power (which was how the doctrine ended up being 
interpreted in the United States178). Instead, Stuart argues that: 
 
 172. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2651–52. 
 173. Stuart, supra note 4, at 972. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. at 970. 
 177. Id. at 985–96. 
 178. See supra Part II.A. 
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Although Blackstone placed his provision for in loco parentis within 
[a] description of parental power, the overall context179 places 
Blackstone’s reference to in loco parentis as equally referring to 
both duties and powers of parents to be placed in the hands of the 
“tutor or schoolmaster” as it can to being limited to just a 
delegation of disciplinary power. The conjunction “and” and the 
limiting phrase “as may be necessary to answer the purposes for 
which he is employed”180 suggest that the last phrase of 
Blackstone’s charge merely limits the disciplinary power of the 
schoolmaster or tutor without otherwise diminishing the parental 
duties of support and protection that he—the schoolmaster or 
tutor—must likewise undertake.181 
In other words, Stuart argues that what Blackstone originally meant 
when he referred to in loco parentis was that the “tutor or 
schoolmaster” receives from the children’s parents both the power to 
discipline and the duty to protect the children in his care.182 “Thus,” 
Stuart concludes, “the in loco parentis doctrine for apprenticeship 
educational programs was not confined to the master’s capacity to 
discipline the apprentice. . . . [P]arents were conveying both welfare 
and tutelary responsibilities, not just disciplinary duties.”183 
However, Stuart points out that in the United States, courts 
“never really adopted in loco parentis as a usable doctrine of behavior 
for professional educators but merely as a convenient legal Latinism 
for something distinct from Blackstone’s meaning.”184 The American 
version of in loco parentis was “distinct,” according to Stuart, 
because it completely dropped the welfare duty that was part and 
parcel of Blackstone’s original conception and instead focused 
exclusively on the disciplinary aspects of parental power.185 In fact, 
 
 179. Stuart is referring to the context surrounding Blackstone’s oft-quoted statement in 
his Commentaries. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 180. The entirety of Blackstone’s formulation is as follows: 
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the 
tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a 
portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint 
and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is 
employed. 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *441. 
 181. Stuart, supra note 4, at 988. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 988, 990 (emphasis added). 
 184. Id. at 991. 
 185. Id. (arguing that after the U.S. courts adopted in loco parentis to justify educators’ 
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Stuart remarks that American courts were “loath to impose a high 
level of responsibility on teachers” and, “[a]s a consequence, most 
jurisdictions that have weighed in on the issue typically hold that a 
teacher only has a duty of supervision, not a duty to the child’s 
welfare.”186 Therefore, Stuart concludes that “U.S. courts did not 
properly adopt the in loco parentis doctrine as likely envisioned by 
Blackstone to include both the welfare and disciplinary powers of the 
parent.”187 
Having established that only half of the in loco parentis doctrine 
was adopted in the United States, Stuart goes on to argue that the 
Court’s recent reliance upon the doctrine in student search cases is 
inappropriate for three reasons. First, because the American version 
of in loco parentis includes only the parent’s authority to discipline, 
it is inappropriate to use in loco parentis to justify student searches 
because “[s]earches are not disciplinary measures. . . . Instead, 
searches are a police function—perhaps a uniquely institutional 
function—designed to create a safe educational environment, not a 
parental function delegated to the school.”188 Hence, in loco parentis 
cannot provide school administrators with the authority to conduct 
student searches since searches do not fall within the disciplinary 
power given to schools via in loco parentis. Second, even if the 
ability to conduct a search could somehow be circumscribed by a 
parent’s disciplinary power, it still would not justify school 
administrators’ searches because any such search is conducted on 
“behalf of third parties” and therefore “[a] parent’s delegation of 
power would not, logically, cover that analysis. Searching a student 
for the health and safety of the student body and the educational 
environment is an institutional goal, not a delegation of power from 
a parent.”189 The equivalent of allowing such searches under in loco 
parentis is, according to Stuart, like allowing “a mother’s searching 
the neighbor children before they can play with her children,”190 
which would not be condoned by in loco parentis anyway. Finally, 
Stuart argues that because parents themselves are suing the schools 
 
disciplinary power, they “did not also invoke the doctrine to hold public schools accountable 
for the welfare of students”). 
 186. Id. at 991–92 (citing sources). 
 187. Id. at 992. 
 188. Id. at 993. 
 189. Id. at 994 (emphasis added). 
 190. Id.  
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because they disagree with what the schools have done, it is difficult 
to see how the school’s power to conduct the challenged searches 
came from the very parents who are challenging those searches, 
which is precisely the conclusion that in loco parentis demands.191 
For these reasons, Stuart argues that in loco parentis ought to be 
abandoned by the courts. 
B. Why In Loco Parentis Is Anachronistic 
Professor Stuart argues that in loco parentis ought to be 
abandoned because it is anachronistic and does not meet the needs 
of our modern system of public education. First, Stuart argues that 
in loco parentis was developed within an educational system where 
education was completely voluntary and financed almost entirely by 
private parties, either through apprenticeships, private tutors, or 
private schools.192 Thus, because the apprentice typically lived with 
the master (or the tutor with the student), it was natural and 
appropriate to assume that the master stood in loco parentis over his 
apprentice, and that therefore he had the power and the duty to 
both discipline and care for the apprentice.193 However, Stuart 
argues that neither of these duties make much sense within an “era 
of involuntary delegation occasioned by compulsory attendance laws 
and of large public schools with responsibilities that often go beyond 
educational function.”194 If parents have no choice about to whom 
they send their child for an education, does it make sense to say that 
when the student does go, the parents have “voluntarily” delegated 
their authority to that school? But, Stuart argues, this is precisely 
what in loco parentis implies, namely, a voluntary delegation of 
authority, which is impossible in the context of public schools.195 
Hence, because of the involuntary nature of our modern educational 
system and because modern educators often have responsibilities that 
extend beyond education, Stuart concludes that the doctrine of in 
 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at 988–89; see also id. at 971 (“In loco parentis assumes a voluntary delegation of 
parental authority and was envisioned during a time of either home-schooling tutors or small 
residential, private schools.”). 
 193. Id. at 988. 
 194. Id. at 971. 
 195. Id.  
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:30 PM 
1695 Letting the Legislature Decide 
 1725 
loco parentis, whatever its merits, is simply inapplicable within that 
system.196 
Stuart’s second argument stems from the fact that modern 
educators themselves do not view themselves as standing in loco 
parentis.197 And if the educators themselves do not know what in 
loco parentis means, Stuart argues, why should the Court continue 
to rely upon it? “As a term of art,” Stuart asserts, “[in loco parentis] 
provides teachers no guidance in classroom management, and 
professional educators would not touch the doctrine with a ten-foot 
barge pole because it is descriptive, not normative. It is a legalism 
not modern reality.”198 Instead, Stuart contends that the Court 
ought to abandon in loco parentis entirely and follow the example of 
other “modern educational managers” who have already adopted 
“more professional standards.”199 Stuart argues that such standards, 
which are typically developed by educational experts, would be much 
more useful in determining the extent of administrative authority in 
public schools because they would provide “objective norms of 
educational professionalism” that could be easily evaluated by the 
courts.200 The lack of such guidelines has caused the Court to 
improperly use in loco parentis and put its 
imprimatur on . . . outliers and the outermost boundaries of 
collective institutional behavior, not based on any coherent 
standards but on some loosely defined doctrine that allows courts 
to throw up their collective hands and say, “We don’t understand 
how to run schools so we won’t interfere, regardless of what we 
really think.”201 
IV. IN DEFENSE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS 
Professor Stuart’s arguments against the Court’s reliance upon in 
loco parentis fail to provide a compelling case for abandoning the 
doctrine entirely. Furthermore, her proposed solution to the 
 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at 984 (“[A] fairly recent, albeit small, survey of teachers indicated that many did 
not know what in loco parentis means; the majority of respondents stated that they had no 
right to react to students as a parent would”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 993. 
 200.  Id. at 1000, 1004. 
 201. Id. at 1004 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002)). 
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problem facing the Court in this area is one that ought to be 
adopted by local school boards and state legislatures rather than 
imposed by the judiciary. 
A. What Constitutes “Improper Adoption” of Common Law Principles? 
Professor Stuart’s first argument against in loco parentis is a 
curious one. As discussed previously, Stuart contends that 
Blackstone’s understanding of in loco parentis was different than the 
concept that was later adopted by American courts.202 In essence, 
this argument boils down to a quasi-originalist position regarding 
the common law, one that asserts that common law principles are 
“properly adopted” only if they remain faithful to the principle as it 
was originally (i.e., historically) understood. As mentioned earlier, 
Stuart argues that in loco parentis was originally understood to 
impose both disciplinary and custodial duties on the person standing 
in the place of the parent.203 However, since American courts only 
imposed the disciplinary duties and ignored or rejected the custodial 
side of the doctrine, according to Stuart in loco parentis was 
“improperly adopted” in American jurisdictions and therefore ought 
to be rejected.204 
This position, however, seems to fly in the face of what most 
scholars consider to be the strengths of the common law system, 
namely the common law’s ability to adapt and evolve over time. As 
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said:  
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The 
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even 
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a 
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules 
by which men should be governed.205 
If Holmes is right,  then it necessarily follows that as our experiences, 
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, and 
prejudices change, so should the common law. Indeed, most scholars 
 
 202. See supra Part III.A.  
 203. Stuart, supra note 4, at 988, 990. 
 204. Id. at 991–92. 
 205. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
1963). 
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consider the adaptability of the common law  to be a strength of the 
system, not a weakness. 
For instance, as the following table shows, there are a number of 
common law doctrines whose modern forms differ from the way they 












children have no 










Landlord has an 




No such duty: 
lessee has a cause 
of action against 
the holdover 





 206. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 115 (8th ed. 2009). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Both the American and English rules are discussed in Hannan v. Dusch, 153 S.E. 
824, 826–28 (Va. 1930). Dukeminier’s textbook on property also discusses both of these 
rules, using Hannan as the case-in-chief. DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 384–87 (6th ed. 
2006). After presenting Hannan, the texbook authors note that “[c]ase law on the matter of 
delivery of possession remains divided, with substantial support for both the English and the 
American rule.” Id. at 387. 
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Revival of wills 
A subsequent will 
could revoke a 
prior will only if 
the subsequent 
will remained in 
force until the 
testator’s death.209 
A subsequent will 
revokes a prior will 
upon the subsequent 
will’s execution, 
but the prior will 
can be revived by 
revoking the 
subsequent will if 





required privity of 
contract; third 
parties had no 
cause of action. 
Liability does not 
require privity of 
contract; third 
parties may sue for 
negligence. 
 
And yet, no one has argued that these doctrines ought to be 
abandoned simply because their current forms differ from the way in 
which they were originally conceived.  
Consider, for instance, the evolution of liability for negligence at 
common law. Originally, the common law required privity of 
contract before a negligence claim could be sustained.212 This rule 
made its way to the United States, where an exception to the privity 
rule was created for products that “put human life in imminent 
danger,”213 but otherwise the privity rule survived intact.214 
 
 209. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 206, at 304. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See infra notes 212–16 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of these two 
principles. 
 212. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex.); 10 M. & 
W. 109, 114–15 (holding that “[u]nless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to 
the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I 
can see no limit, would ensue”). 
 213. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409 (1852) (holding defendants liable for 
mislabeling a poison as an herb); see also Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064–65 
(N.Y. 1909) (holding the manufacturer of a defective coffee urn liable when the urn 
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However, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co., Judge Cardozo 
famously rejected the privity of contract requirement, and instead 
adopted a much broader theory of negligence: 
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place 
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of 
danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be 
expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge 
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and 
used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the 
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it 
carefully.215 
Of course, the common law theory of negligence continued (and still 
continues) to evolve, but post-MacPherson, negligence looked a lot 
different than it did originally. Manufacturers were now liable to 
third parties who were injured by defectively manufactured “things 
of danger”—a principle originally rejected at common law because of  
fear that it would create “the most absurd and outrageous 
consequences.”216 Cardozo apparently disagreed with this 
assessment, however, and thus changed negligence completely.  
Following the logic of Stuart’s argument, Cardozo’s change to 
negligence law in MacPherson is evidence that the concept of 
“negligence” was “improperly adopted” by American courts, and as 
such, it should be rejected because it was not in accordance with 
how the doctrine was originally conceived. 
But why should we accept Stuart’s contention that departure 
from a common law doctrine as it was originally conceived is 
grounds for its rejection? In MacPherson, there appear to be very 
good reasons for departing from the privity of contract rule: 
automobiles are inherently dangerous, and if they are not 
manufactured properly, large numbers of people could be seriously 
injured or killed. Manufacturers know that their products are 
 
exploded). 
 214. See, e.g., Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801, 803 (2d Cir. 1915) 
(refusing to hold a car company liable to a third party who was injured by a defectively 
manufactured wheel because the third party lacked privity of contract: “one who manufactures 
articles dangerous only if defectively made, or installed, e.g., tables, chairs, pictures or mirrors 
hung on the walls, carriages, automobiles, and so on, is not liable to third parties for injuries 
caused by them, except in case of willful injury or fraud”). 
 215. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (emphasis added). 
 216. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405. 
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dangerous, and they know that these products are going to be sold 
to third parties. Hence, as a matter of policy it seems just and fair to 
hold manufacturers of “things of danger” liable for lapses in 
craftsmanship, and hence Cardozo’s departure from the traditional 
privity of contract requirement seems justified.  
Likewise, in the case of in loco parentis, there appear to be good 
reasons why American courts accepted only the disciplinary side of 
the doctrine as traditionally understood, while rejecting the custodial 
side. For one, the fact that the doctrine was initially invoked only in 
cases where discipline was concerned indicates that courts felt the 
need to justify a teacher’s power to impose discipline and order in 
the classroom but were reluctant to give the teacher enough control 
so as to give rise to a constitutional duty to protect. Justice Scalia 
made this clear in Vernonia when he said “[w]hile we do not, of 
course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a 
degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional 
‘duty to protect,’ we have acknowledged that for many purposes 
‘school authorities ac[t] in loco parentis.’”217 Thus, with regards to in 
loco parentis, it appears as though courts only wanted to accept part 
of the doctrine, as it was traditionally understood, while rejecting the 
other, just like the courts initially accepted part of the doctrine of 
negligence, as it was originally understood, only to reject part later. 
In both cases, the “new” doctrine differed from the original 
understanding, but in both cases the courts’ adoption of the 
“newer” doctrine appears justified. Hence, it is unclear why a 
deviation from the traditional understanding of a common law 
doctrine should provide grounds for rejecting it entirely. 
B. Dispelling Three More Arguments Against In Loco Parentis 
The fact that the courts “improperly adopted” in loco parentis is 
not Stuart’s only argument for its rejection. As outlined above,218 she 
also argues that, even if the doctrine was “properly adopted,” there 
are three other conceptual difficulties surrounding the Court’s recent 
reliance upon it. However, these other difficulties also fail to provide 
grounds for a complete dismissal of in loco parentis. 
 
 217. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (alteration in original) 
(citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); Bethel 
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)). 
 218.  See supra Part III. 
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1. Searches are not “disciplinary” 
First, as noted above,219 Stuart argues that since the American 
version of in loco parentis includes only a parent’s disciplinary power, 
it therefore cannot be used to justify student searches because a 
search is not a form of discipline (although discipline might result 
from the search).220 However, while Stuart’s distinction here 
between disciplinary authority and search authority might be 
plausible, the fact remains that the Supreme Court has recognized 
that parents undeniably have the power to conduct searches, 
including strip searches.221 It is therefore plausible that, contra 
Stuart’s contention, searches could be, via the application of in loco 
parentis, “a parental function delegated to the school.”222  
In fact, once the parental authority to conduct a search is 
recognized, further analysis of the conceptual link between searches 
and discipline brings Stuart’s initial distinction into question. 
However, in order to understand just how discipline and searches are 
related, a few observations must be made. First, searches are usually 
conducted only upon suspicion of wrongdoing and upon the belief 
that evidence of wrongdoing will be discovered by the search. 
Second, parents and school administrators share the same 
motivations for conducting a search. That is, both parents and 
administrators (a) want to protect other children and (b) want to 
deter the wrongdoer from engaging in further wrongdoing by 
administering punishment should evidence of wrongdoing be 
discovered. While an analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of 
penal theory are beyond the scope of this paper, when viewed 
through this larger lens, the link between disciplinary authority and 
the ability to conduct a search does not appear as tenuous as Stuart 
claims it to be. In fact, the authority to conduct searches seems to 
stem directly from one’s authority to administer punishment, 
especially since any punishment administered without evidence is 
unjust. Thus, contra Stuart, it appears as though the disciplinary 
 
 219. See supra Part III.A. 
 220. Stuart, supra note 4, at 993. 
 221. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2656 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“There can be no doubt that a 
parent would have had the authority to conduct the search at issue in this case.” (citing New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336, 337 (1985); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 
(1987))). 
 222.  Stuart, supra note 4, at 993. 
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authority of school administrators does provide sufficient justification 
for student searches. 
2. Student searches are motivated by institutional rather than 
individual concerns 
As outlined earlier,223 Stuart argues that under in loco parentis, 
parents give school officials the authority to search their child, 
individually, but in the student-search cases, the searches were 
conducted on behalf of third parties, namely the other students. 
Hence, Stuart tries to conclude that just as a parent does not have 
the authority to search the neighbors’ children before they can play 
with her children, schools do not have the authority to search some 
children in order to protect other children. The authority to conduct 
such a search must stem from the parents of the child that was 
actually searched and not from the student body as a whole. 
This analogy, however, appears to be faulty because Stuart fails 
to recognize that for any student at school, that student’s parents 
have, by virtue of the in loco parentis doctrine, given the school the 
authority to search their child. Hence, to return to Stuart’s analogy, 
it is not clear why a parent would not have the authority to search 
the neighbors’ children if the neighbors had given that parent the 
authority to do so, which appears to be precisely what in loco parentis 
does within the context of public schools. Hence, it seems irrelevant 
that student safety is an “institutional goal”: if the school has the 
authority to search every student, it does not matter whether the 
“goal” stems from the parents giving that authority or the desire to 
preserve a safe learning environment. In fact, it seems entirely likely 
that one of the reasons why parents would consent to allow schools 
to search their children would be because they want their students to 
be learning in a safe environment. Thus, the disconnect that Stuart is 
complaining about between in loco parentis and the “institutional 
goal” of safety does not appear to be very critical. Rather, it appears 
as though in loco parentis is more than capable of supporting the 
institutional goal of safety rather than undermining it. 
 
 223. See supra Part III.A. 
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3. Parental challenges to administrative decisions are incompatible 
with in loco parentis 
Stuart’s final argument in this area could be formalized as 
follows: 
1. In loco parentis stands for the proposition that school 
administrators obtain their authority to curtail student speech, 
conduct student searches, etc., from the parents’ voluntary 
delegation of parental authority.224 (Premise) 
2. Voluntary delegation of authority implies agreement with or 
ratification of the decisions made pursuant to that authority. That 
is, unless the grantor would agree with or ratify the exercise of the 
delegated authority, she cannot be deemed to have granted it in 
the first place.225 (Premise) 
3. As evidenced by the amount of litigation in this area, parents 
often do not agree or ratify administrative decisions.226 (Fact) 
4. Hence, these parents cannot be viewed as having “voluntarily 
delegated” their authority to school administrators. (Follows from 
(2) and (3)) 
5. Hence, in loco parentis cannot be used to justify administrative 
authority in situations where the parents disagree with the 
administrator’s decisions.227 (Follows from (1) and (4)) 
In short, Stuart seems to be arguing that if a parent challenges an 
administrative decision, it is inconsistent to argue that the 
administrator’s authority to make that decision came from the very 
person who is disagreeing with or challenging that decision. 
However, as the formalization above is meant to show, Premise 
(2) is dubious at best. To predicate “voluntary delegation” upon 
“agreement with” or “ratification” of the exercise of the delegated 
authority is a stringent standard indeed, and one that is rarely 
implemented in agreements of this sort. For instance, consider the 
following situations: 
 
 224. See Stuart, supra note 4, at 994. 
 225. See id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1734 
1. U.S. citizens bestow decision making authority upon elected 
representatives, whom they trust will exercise that authority in their 
best interest. 
2. Parents delegate their disciplinary and custodial duties (and the 
authority that comes with those duties) to babysitters, with the 
understanding that this authority will be used to accomplish the 
demands of these duties. 
3. A principal gives an agent power to make legally binding 
agreements on behalf of the principal, and the fiduciary duties that 
arise from this relationship ensure that the agent will behave in a 
manner that is consistent with the principal’s desires. 
In each of these situations, the grantor believes (and probably should 
believe) that the grantee will exercise the delegated authority in a 
manner similar to the way the grantor would exercise it. In fact, 
Stuart is probably right to point out that were it otherwise, the 
grantors would probably never trust the grantees with their 
authority. However, that is not what Premise (2) claims. Premise (2) 
requires conformity as a precondition of the grant, which seems to be 
very rare in situations like this. To illustrate, if Premise (2) were true, 
then it seems that in each situation mentioned above, the grantee’s 
authority would be destroyed if the grantor disagreed with the 
grantee’s exercise of that authority. And yet, an elected 
representative’s authority is not destroyed simply because his 
constituency disagrees with his decisions; a babysitter’s authority is 
not destroyed merely because she decides to put the children to bed 
before their normal bedtime; and an agent’s authority is not 
destroyed just because he handles a situation differently than the 
principal would have (assuming that the agent adequately defended 
the principal’s interests without breaching his fiduciary duties).   
In other words, in each of these situations it seems much more 
likely to claim that, while the grantor expects conformity, she does 
not require it as a precondition of the grant of that authority. Rather, 
the grantor probably realizes that the grantee will still be allowed to 
exercise independent judgment, particularly in high-pressure or 
emergency situations, and while the grantor may have acted 
differently in these situations, as long as the grantee did his or her 
best to conform to what he or she believed was proper under the 
circumstances, the grantor cannot reasonably claim that the grantee 
did not possess the authority to act. Likewise, in the case of in loco 
parentis, while it is true that parents challenging the decisions of 
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school administrators would have acted differently, that does not 
automatically imply that the administrator’s authority to make that 
decision was destroyed. Instead, given the observations above, 
whether the grantor would have done the same thing under similar 
circumstances appears to be irrelevant as far as the validity of the 
grant of authority is concerned. Once the authority is given, the 
grantee can (and should) expect some reasonable amount of 
discretion to make independent decisions without fearing that she 
might undermine that authority simply because her decision does 
not conform to what the grantor would have done. Hence, even if 
the parent who gave the administrator the authority would not have 
conducted the search or would not have suppressed the speech in 
question, it does not follow that the administrator could not do so 
under the authority that was originally delegated. In short, Premise 
(2) is invalid: mere nonconformity with the grantor’s expectations is 
not sufficient to revoke the initial grant of authority; and when 
viewed in this way, the apparent contradiction between parental 
challenges to administrative authority and in loco parentis disappears. 
C. Is In Loco Parentis Really Anachronistic? 
In addition to the foregoing arguments, Professor Stuart makes 
two more arguments that stem from her contention that in loco 
parentis is anachronistic.  
1. In loco parentis is anachronistic because of mandatory attendance 
laws 
Stuart’s first argument alleges that the “involuntary delegation 
[of parental authority] occasioned by compulsory attendance laws” 
renders the in loco parentis doctrine inapplicable within the modern 
context of public education.228 However, upon closer inspection, our 
modern educational system does not appear as “mandatory” as 
Stuart claims it to be. Instead, as Professor Anne Proffitt Dupre has 
pointed out, “all fifty states have passed statutes that allow parents, 
subject to various checks and conditions, to teach their children at 
home.”229 Professor Dupre continues: “[Under these statutes], the 
parents also choose whether to keep to themselves all of the parental 
 
 228. Id. at 971. 
 229. Dupre, supra note 57, at 89. 
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power that is necessary to restrain and correct the child so that he 
may obtain an education, or, instead, to delegate the duty and the 
accompanying power to someone else.”230 Furthermore, in addition 
to the homeschooling option, the rise of legislation permitting the 
creation of charter schools has also provided parents with an 
alternative to public schools.231 Finally, as Justice Thomas pointed 
out, even if there were no private school, charter school, or 
homeschool options available to parents, modern public education 
would still not be completely “mandatory” because parents could 
“simply move” if they disagreed with the decision of their local 
school board or school administrators.232 Hence, in light of these 
facts, even though students must go to school in our “modern” 
system of public education, it does not follow that the parents are 
not choosing to send them to public schools. Given the presence of 
other educational options and the ability to “simply move,” even 
within our modern system in loco parentis is anything but 
anachronistic. 
2. Educators do not view themselves as standing in loco parentis 
Stuart’s second argument that in loco parentis is anachronistic 
stems from the fact that teachers do not view themselves as standing 
in loco parentis.233 In her article, Stuart points to a survey given to 
teachers wherein “the majority of respondents stated that they had 
no right to react to students as a parent would.”234 From this survey, 
Stuart draws the following conclusion: 
A more comprehensive survey is likely unnecessary to conclude that 
educators do not rely on the in loco parentis doctrine because it is 
meaningless to them . . . . As a term of art, it provides teachers no 
guidance in classroom management, and professional educators 
 
 230. Id. at 90 (citing cases). 
 231. According to the U.S. Department of Education Institute of Education Sciences in 
2008-09 there were 1,433,116 students enrolled in 4694 charter schools nationwide. U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ. Inst. of Educ. Scis.,  Digest of Education Statistics, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. 
STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_100.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 
2011). 
 232. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2656 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 233. Stuart, supra note 4, at 984. 
 234. Id. 
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would not touch the doctrine with a ten-foot barge pole because it 
is descriptive, not normative.235 
As a substitute for in loco parentis, Stuart argues that the courts 
should adopt more “objective” educational standards, as they are 
developed by educational experts.236 These standards, Stuart argues, 
would govern the relationships between students and school 
administrators in a more “predictable and noncontroversial fashion” 
than in loco parentis.237 This would also simultaneously allow 
teachers and administrators to better manage their classrooms and 
schools (since their responsibilities and authority would be clearly 
articulated)238 and courts to more consistently settle disputes arising 
within the context of public education (since these normative 
standards are easier to consistently apply).239 
Like those that have preceded it, there are a number of problems 
with this argument. First, the conclusion drawn from the survey is 
suspect because of the survey’s size. Stuart herself recognizes that the 
survey was small,240 which amounts to an implicit recognition that, if 
its size were increased, a different result might be obtained. But even 
more problematic than its size is the fact that the survey’s results 
seem to directly contradict Stuart’s sweeping conclusion that “[a] 
more comprehensive survey is likely unnecessary to conclude that 
educators do not rely on the in loco parentis doctrine because it is 
meaningless to them.”241 According to the survey, teachers were 
asked whether they had a right to respond to disciplinary issues as 
parents would.242 In response, 31% of the teachers surveyed said that 
they did have that right, and 41% answered “perhaps.”243 On the 
other hand, only 18.3% said that they could not respond as a parent 
would.244 Hence, the fact that 72% of teachers believed that they 
 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 996–1003. 
 237. Id. at 1000, 1004. 
 238. Id. at 999–1000 (arguing that these normative professional standards “are 
nevertheless much easier to follow and understand for teachers and school administrators”). 
 239. Id. at 1000 (arguing that these normative standards “would allow courts to judge 
school district behavior against an objective standard”). 
 240. Id. at 984. In fact, the sample size included only sixty teachers. Anthony E. Conte, 
In Loco Parentis: Alive and Well, 121 EDUC. 196, 196–97 (2000).  
 241. Stuart, supra note 4, at 984. 
 242.  Conte, supra note 240, at 196. 
 243.  Id. at 197. 
 244.  Id. 
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either do have or might have the ability to act in loco parentis seems 
to indicate that in loco parentis is anything but a meaningless 
concept to modern educators. 
Furthermore, even if we grant Stuart’s argument that educators 
do not rely upon the concept of in loco parentis, it does not follow 
that the doctrine is deficient. Stuart’s conclusion here (i.e., that in 
loco parentis is anachronistic and ought to be rejected) would be 
much stronger if she could show that teachers do not rely upon in 
loco parentis because the doctrine itself is inconsistent or 
incomprehensible. However, as the prior sections have attempted to 
show, the doctrine itself is not to blame for the current state of 
confusion among educators. Rather, in loco parentis and its 
applicability within the context of public schools has been clouded 
by the Supreme Court’s extremely inconsistent application of it, and 
hence, some confusion amongst educators ought to be expected.  
After all, as shown previously, prior to the twentieth century 
there appears to have been little to no confusion respecting a 
teacher’s authority and its source.245 It was the apparent rejection of 
in loco parentis in Tinker and T.L.O.—and the Court’s refusal to 
bury the doctrine in its subsequent decisions—that has led to the 
current state of confusion, and currently the Court seems to be torn 
between the traditional in loco parentis model of educational 
authority and the agents-of-the-state model. Until that tension is 
definitively and soundly resolved, there will continue to be confusion 
regarding the extent of educational authority in public schools. But 
this does not mean that in loco parentis itself is anachronistic and, as 
a result, confusing to educators. Rather, it simply means that the 
Court is undecided about the extent to which it ought to be applied, 
as illustrated by Justice Thomas’s and Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinions in Morse.246 Absent a showing that the confusion 
surrounding the doctrine stems from the doctrine itself, Stuart’s 
conclusion that the doctrine ought to be rejected on these grounds 
is not justified. 
Finally, Stuart’s ultimate conclusion that in loco parentis ought 
to be replaced by “objective norms of educational professionalism”247 
is problematic because it represents a solution to the problem that 
 
 245. See supra Part II.A. 
 246. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 247. Stuart, supra note 4, at 1000. 
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should be imposed by the legislature, not the judiciary. Even if 
Stuart’s proposed norms could provide all of the advantages she 
mentions, the fact remains that in order for the judiciary to 
implement her suggestions, it would have to overrule a large part of 
its jurisprudence in this area and adopt these new models of 
administrative authority wholesale. This is problematic for two 
reasons: first, as already indicated, Stuart’s proposal calls for the 
judiciary to usurp the role of the legislature, and second, it calls for 
judges to make a decision that they are simply not qualified to make. 
Judges are not educational experts. Nor are they familiar with the 
policy considerations that would be implicated by the drastic reforms 
being proposed by Stuart. Both of these facts point to a single 
conclusion—that the judiciary should not be making this decision. 
As Justice Thomas has pointed out: 
In the end, the task of implementing and amending public school 
policies is beyond this court’s function. Parents, teachers, school 
administrators, local politicians, and state officials are all better 
suited than judges to determine the appropriate limits on searches 
conducted by school officials. Preservation of order, discipline, and 
safety in public schools is simply not the domain of the 
Constitution. And, common sense is not a judicial monopoly or a 
Constitutional imperative.248 
 Of course, this statement raises the question of why the legislative 
branch or school boards are in a better position to tackle the reforms 
proposed by Stuart. Presumably, like judges, legislators are also not 
educational experts, and so why would they be in a better position to 
reform the educational system? The answer is political accountability. 
While it is true that legislators themselves are not educational 
experts, unlike judges, their role is to carefully consider suggestions 
like the ones proposed by Stuart, and if they determine that more 
expertise is needed, committees can be formed, the proper experts 
can be consulted, and informed decisions can be made. These 
resources are simply not available to judges, and judges are not 
charged with the task of implementing such reforms. Furthermore, 
legislators, unlike most judges, are politically accountable to their 
constituencies. Hence, if reforms like the ones proposed by Stuart 
are, in fact, desired by parents, teachers, school administrators, and 
 
 248. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2657 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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school boards, the legislature should theoretically be more responsive 
and motivated to make a detailed inquiry into such proposals. 
For these reasons, even if Stuart is right and the doctrine of in 
loco parentis “would be enormously improved by death,”249 her 
proposed substitute is one that the Court arguably cannot adopt 
without usurping the legislature’s role, and furthermore it is one that 
the Court is simply not qualified to implement. Hence, even though 
in loco parentis is currently mired in confusion, and even though 
Stuart’s “objective norms of educational professionalism”250 would 
arguably improve the situation, the Court’s refusal to abandon in 
loco parentis and its continued reliance on its own precedent in this 
area (of which in loco parentis is a part) is a shining example of 
judicial restraint that ought to be praised, rather than condemned. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Professor Stuart has argued that the common law doctrine of in 
loco parentis itself is responsible for the sorry and confusing state of 
the Supreme Court’s student search and student speech 
jurisprudence, as well as for the general absence of clarity in legal 
discussions concerning administrative authority within public 
schools. Furthermore, she has also argued that in loco parentis 
would be “enormously improved by death” because the doctrine (a) 
was improperly adopted by the courts in the United States and (b) is 
anachronistic within the context of modern, public education. This 
Comment has shown how each of these arguments fails to provide 
sufficient grounds for rejecting the doctrine of in loco parentis 
outright. Instead, this Comment has explained the confusion 
surrounding authority in public schools by showing how the Court 
has been torn in its recent decisions between its common law 
explanation of administrative authority in education, which is 
embodied in in loco parentis, and its recent conception of authority, 
as embodied in the Court’s “agents-of-the-state” model of authority.  
While Stuart has proposed that the Court adopt “objective 
norms of educational professionalism” in order to resolve this debate 
and dispel the confusion, this Comment has also shown how this 
proposal is unsatisfactory because it would not require the Court to 
usurp the role of the legislature, but it would also force judges to 
 
249.   Stuart, supra note 4, at 1000 . 
 250. Id. at 983. 
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make policy determinations that they are simply not qualified to 
make. Hence, rather than condemn the Court’s reliance on in loco 
parentis, such reliance ought to be praised as a prime example of 
judicial restraint, for by relying on in loco parentis rather than 
rejecting it, the Court has stayed well within the bounds of its 
constitutional authority. Unfortunately, until society, through its 
duly appointed representatives, makes a firm decision regarding the 
extent of administrative authority within public schools, this area of 
the law will probably remain muddled and unclear. Let’s just not 
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